



Education  and  Employment
Population  and  Human  Resources
Department







Education  yields  externalities  that  appear  stronger  in macroeco-
nomic data than in household-level  studies.  Simulations  show
that there is a small growth externality  as well as a fertility
externality  which  is influenced  by the rate  of return  to education
relative  to that on physical  capital.
lTe Policy Rescarch Working Papers disseminate he findings of work in propsand  encourage theexchangeof  ideas among Bank staff
nd 11  others interested in devdopmentissues.Thesepapas,disatibuted  by the Research Advisory Staff, carry thenames of the authors,
refiect  nlytheirviews, and shouldtbused  and  cited accordingly. Thefindings, intaprtations,  and conclusions arelthe  authors'own.They

















































































































Eduoallon  and Employment
WPS  iO39
This paper  - a product  of the Education  and Emp'oyment  Division,  Population  and Human  Resources
Department  - is part  of a larger  effort  in the depar nent to establish  the  linkages  between  human  capital
investments  and economic  development.  Copies  of  the paper  are available  free  from  the World  Bank, 1818
H Street  NW,  Washington  DC  20433.  Please  contact  PHREE,  room  S6-2  14,  extension  33680  (November
1992,  51 pages).
The benefits  of education  are  usually  assessed  by  power.  Based on a conservative  figure  of a 5 to
analyzing  rates of return.  Social  rates of return  8 percent increase  in eamings  for every  year of
reflect  the fact that education  may be provided  education,  there is some evidence  to support  the
free or at a subsidized  price and that a part of any  presence  of a small  externality,  but the evidence
individual's  income accrues  to the state through  cannot  be said to be overwhelming.
taxation.  But they typically  do not include
private  benefits  that are not directly  connected  There is, however,  much clearer  evidence  of
with the individual's  gross eamings;  nor do they  a link between  education  and fertility  rates.  The
include  the external  effects  of education  on  effect is observed  in both macroeconomic  data
economic  growth.  and household  studies,  but is stronger in macro-
economic  data for reasons  that are not clear. This
Some  benefits are generally  omitted  from  effect constitutes  an extemality  that - at a time
calculations  of social retums  to education,  but  of widespread  (but not universal)  concem about
the estimates  produced  - ranging  from 13  population  growth  - is of great importance.
percent  to 26 percent  - are implausibly  high.
There are several  reasons  for this. Studies  may  Weale  develops  a simulation  model from
not reflect  the fact that family background  work  by Barro and Becker.  The model links
influences  both the likelihood  of participating  in  fertility  decisions  with consumption/saving
education  and a person's future  eaming  power  decisions.  In this model,  parents  derive  utility
even without  education.  Failure  to take account  from their children's welfare;  as a consequence,
of the effects  of quality of education  may also  children  are a form of saving. The  model is
lead to upward  bias.  extended  to reflect  education  as an endogenous
decision  and then  further  to look at the effects  of
An altemative  approach  is to make  cross-  an external  effect of education  on economic
country  comparisons  using  macroeconomic  data.  growth.  Simulations  demonstrate  that the rate of
A number  of such studies are discussed.  In  return  on education  relative  to that on physical
assessing  whether  education  has any external  capital  is a major influence  on fertility,  suggest-
effect on economic  growth,  assumptions  must be  ing that the model sheds  some light on
made about  education's  direct effect  on earning  education's  extemal effect  on fertility.
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is to get these findings  out quickly,  even if presentations  are less than fully polished. The fndings, interpretations,  and
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Analysis  of the economic  effects  of education  has usually  focused  on an assessment
of the rate of return. A comparison  of the incomes  of the educated  with those of the uneducated
allows  a rate of return to education  to be calculated. In addition to this private return to the
individual,  a social  rate of return can also  be estimated,  taking  into account  the cost of education
to society  rather than on individual's  incomes. To the individual,  education  incurs  a direct cost in
terms of fees and an additional  opportunity  cost in terms of earnings  foregone. The social  cost of
education  is likely  to differ  from the private  cost because  many  countries  have  a policy  of providing
at least basic education  free or at a heavily-subsidized  price. The social return also differs from
private return because individuals  receive  their incomes  net of taxes, while the contribution  to
national  income is made gross  of tax. E timates  of the private and social  return to education  are
presented in section  2.1
There are a number of reasons for being unhappy  with an approach  based on the
rate of return as it is usually  calculated. These are also discussed  in section  2.1. First of all, in the
nature  of things,  one cannot  identify  all the factors  which  influence  earning  power. Individuals  with
a favorable  family  background  may be more likely  to receive  education,  and the effects  of family
background  may be mistaken for the effects of education.  Secondly,  the specific  inclusion  of
variables reflecting  the quality of education may influence  assessments  of the rate of return.
Thirdly,  education  may  confer  a relative  advantage  as much  as an absolute  advantage. It may  allow
the educated to gain at the expense  of the uneducated. On the other hand, analyses  based on
macroeconomic  data, such  as those of section  2.2, should  not be susceptible  to this problem.
These macroeconomic  studies typically  explain  economic  growth over a period of
twenty  years  or more by means  of investment  in physical  capital,  variables  representing  education
level,  or, in one study, expenditure  on education,  and variables  summarizing  political  instability.
They provide a basis for assessing  the argument that education  may have effects on economic
performance  over and above those identified  by the usual  rate of return analysis. Education  may
facilitate  technical  progress. This will  benefit both the educated  and the uneducated  alike. This,
if true, creates an externality  which  is likely  to be reflected  in any  analysis  based  on macroeconomic
data but will  obviously  not be visible  in any cross-section  study. This part of the paper looks  at the
evidence  for an external  effect  of education  on growth.
There may be other benefits of education.  There is good evidence,  presented in
section  2.3, to suggest  that education  reduces  fertility  rates. If one is persuaded  that high fertility
poses a major long-term threat to living standards, then this externality  may be of very great
importance,  particularly  since the evidence  for this extemality  is stronger than for an externality
linking  education  to economic  growth. On the other hand, it is not obvious  what economic  value
should  be placed  on the fertility  rate; in this  paper, no valuation  is attempted in the assessment  of
this effect.2
At the same time as reducing  fertilit, and possibly  partly related to this, education
seems to have a positive  influence  on health. In section  2.4,  a variety  of effects  are discussed. In
developing  countries  parental education  leads to a reduction  in child mortality. Related to this,
despite not being an external  effect,  is the suggestion  that healthy  children  learn more efficiently.
While the effects  of improved  health are very important,  they are also reasonably
straightforward  to appreciate. The theoretical  basis for the impact  of education  on fertility  and
economic growth, however,  merits further investigation. In section 3, a simulation model is
developed. This model  assumes  that family  size  is an economic  choice  and sets out, first of all, the
links between education  and fertility,  on the assumption  that  technical  progress  is exogenous. It
is demonstrated  that fertility  increase  is decreasing  in the cost of raising  children,  but increasing  in
the rate of exogenous  per capita growth. Education  is introduced  into the model  by making  the
duration of education  (and thus the cost of raising  children)  sensitive  to the return to education.
The interaction between the return to education and the endogenously-determined  return to
physical  capital appears to be the dominant route by which  the return to education influences
fertility.
In section 4, the model is extended  by making  technical  progress depend on the
duration of education; the simulation results enable one to  identify  the overall effects of an
extension  of education  in terms of population  growth  and technical  progress, as well  as reflecting
the effects  which  enter into conventional  rate of return calculations.  These simulations  show  a link
between  fertility  and growth  reasonably  similar  in magnitude  to that identified  in empirical  studies.
There is good reason to believe that the demand for education is sensitive  to
economic  factors. Several  studies  (for example,  (King  and Ullard (1987))  look at the effects  of the
cost of education  and confirm  that demand  is sensitive  to its price. They  also stress  the importance
of accessibility  as a factor influencing  the take-up  of education. But the external  effects  alluded to
above mean that one cannot rely solely  on market forces  to deliver  a socially  desirable amount  of
education.
2.  Economic  Development  and Education:  Some  of the Issues Involved
There are several  important routes by which  education  can influence  an economy.
First and foremost,  education  raises  labor productivity.  Improvements  in the educational  attainment
of the population  will tend to be associated  with economic  growth.  This may  be enhanced by the
externalities  discussed  above. An individual  may be more likely  to benefit from a given level  of
education  if there are others with  whom  to co-operate.  And a high flow  of investment  in education
is likely  to lead to more rapid growth  in knowledge  and thus to faster technical  progress.  Secondly,3
there are a number of other effects. Ihe  most important of these is the effect of education  on
fertility,  with educated populations  growing more slowly.  Productivity  is also improved in the
ho'lsehold sphere. Educated farmers are more productive.  And a higher level of education is
associated  with a higher standard of health. These effects  may then feed back into productivity.
A more healthy  workforce  is more productive.  And lower  fertility  is likely  to lead to more healthy
children  who may learn more at school  and be more healthy  and more productive  as adults.
In the context  of developing  countries,  education  is also an important  policy  vehicle
for tackling  poverty  through stimulating  economic  growth. The 1980  World  Development  Report
emphasized  how  important  education  is in terms of influencing  economic  growth. In particular  it
was  stressed  how  human  development,  a condition  directly  and indirectly  affected  by education,  can
lead to reductions in absolute poverty  by promoting  growth. Psacharopoulos  and Steier (1988)
observed this process in Venezuela  between 1975 and 1984. Human development  encompasses
education  and training,  improvements  in health  and nutrition,  and reductions  in fertility  rates. This
view  was reiterated in the World  Development  Report,  1990  which  stated
'...there is ample  evidence  that investing  in human  capital,  especially  education,  also
attacks some  of the most important  causes  of poverty."
Streeten  (1981)  argues  that the externalities  derived  from  basic  education  can be large  in developing
countries,  providing  ample  justification  for expanding  resources  on primary education. We now
proceed to explore the economic  consequences  of education  and its external effects in greater
detail.
2.1  Human Capia  and the  Rehtrn  to Educaton i  Developing  &conomkes
The Human Capital  hypothesis  was proposed  by Schultz  (1963)  and Becker  (1964)
and has been one of the most influential  in the area of the economics  of education. It postulates
that an individual  chooses  an amount  of time to devote  to education,  based on the expected  return
and expected cost.  This approach is concerned  primarily  with choice in education and is less
relevant to compulsory  education'.  An individual  incurs two types of cost when in education.
First, there are the direct costs, such as books, tuition fees, etc., and secondly  there are foregone
earnings. Human capital models  view  educational  choice  as an investment  with individuals  being
concerned  about rates  of return. If an individual's  private  rate of return for some  level  of education
X exceeds  the rate of interest, then it is sensible  for the individual  to be educated at least to level
X.  One problem  in the context  of developing  economies  is that imperfect  capital  markets  and low
'Although  in many  countries  compulsory  education  is not enforced,  particularly  in rural areas  where
monitoring  is difficult.4
levels of  educational  provision  may make  it  difficult for  individuals to  fulfil optimal  plans.
Individuals may be unable to implement their best strategies.
The preceding discussion summarizes the basis of individua!s' private calculations.
The social return does not necessaril) coincide with the private return and, from the perspective
of the state it is the social return which matters. The social rate of return of increasing educational
expenditures is based on pre-tax salaries and costs borne by society as a whole (foregone output
opportunities, resource costs of education, etc.).  It is usually found for advar led economies that
the private return exceeds the social return (Ziderman, 1973, Morris and Ziderman, 1971). These
calculations, which are m'de  by a comparison of the incomes of the educated with those of the
uneducated, omit any externality effects which might be significant  within the context of developing
and developed economies.  They do not reflect the fact that primary education may lead to more
efficient use of  expenditure on public health, or  that  education at more  advanced levels may
increase the rate at which developing countries can take technical advances on board.
A separate problem arises as far as the calculations of private rates of return are
concerned. These represent the average return, but, for any individual, there is a substantial margin
of uncertainty over the benefits of education. In consequence the average return will  have to include
a premium over the return on 'safe' assets before risk-averse individuals can be persuaded to invest
in education (Levhari and Weiss, 1974).
The greatest direct return derived from education in developing economies for which
the evidence can be described as unambiguous is the improvement to labor productivity. These lead
individuals to  attain higher incomes which is reflected in studies that  have focused on rates of
return.2 Psacharopoulos (1985) surveys  a large number of such studies (see table 1) and finds high
rates of return to education in developing countries.  For example, the average social return to
education in  sub-Saharan Africa ranges  from  26% for  primary education  to  13% for higher
education;  for  Asia  the  figures  are  27%  and  13%, respectively, for  Latin  America  and  the
Caribbean 26% and 16%, respectively, with the private return tending to be higher still.
World Development Report, 1991  (p.  57)  quotes  the  results  of  recent  studies
suggesting that an incremental year of education raises wages by between 5% and 25%. These
figures are complimented (p. 43) by estimates for the effect of extension of education on the level
aIhe majority  of research on the link between  education  and productivity  is conducted  by looking  at
returns based on income  streams. This is very much  within  the framework  of the human  capital  approach.
Within the context  of the U.S. Horowitz  and Sherman  (1980)  have undertaken  a study  of the direct effects
of human  capital  on productivity.  This study  was  conducted  on the U.S. Navy.5
of GDP  which imply a  much lower return  to  education. One  extra year of  education of  the
workforce will, it is suggested, raise GDP by 9% for the first three years of education, falling to 4%
for further years of schooling. If the social return ca..  lated from earnings data is 20% and the
share of  labor in the  national product is 75%, then an  extra year of education  for the whole
workforce should raise GDP by around 15%3.  If the figure of 4-9% is believed to be consistent with
the microeconomic results, it implies that the main benefit of education is simply  to give people an
advantage in a close to zero sum game. But it is, on balance, unlikely that the  main effect of
education is to allow the educated to gain at the expense of the uneducated; more probably the
high survey-hased estimates of social rates of return should be treated with caution. There are a
number of reasons for this.
Table 1  Selected Studies of the Return to Education
Calculated from Survey Data
Behrman and Birdsall (1983)  Rates of return in Brazil.  Study takes account of quality
6171 males from  as well
1970 Census.  of education.
Psacharopoulos (1985)  Survey of rates of return  Summary  of  105  country
studies.  55  were  developing
countries.  The  estimates  are
calculated from  cross-section
data. Private and  social rates
of return  shown. Social rates
of  return  do not  include any
external effects.
Glewwe (1991)  Rates of return in Ghana 3200  Study  assesses  return  to
households in 1988-89 survey.  schooling  separately to literacy
Results  on  1586 households  and numeracy.
used in this study.
First of all, there is the possibility that, when estimates of the return are based on
cross-sectional analyses, then the estimates are likely to reflect in part high scarcity returns to a few
more educated individuals. According to Behrman (1990) this is unlikely to persist over time. This
MIbe  calculation  is not exact because,  if the social  rate of return to education  is 20%,  the effect  on adult
wages  of an extra year of education  will  differ slightly.  It will  be higher  because  the cost of providing  the
education  is reflected  in the social  cost, but lower  because  child wages  may be below adult wages.  Not too
much  weight  should  be placed  on the second  point because,  in developing  countries,  people in their mid  to
late teens are often found in primary  schools.6
in itself  need not be a source  for great concem.  Psacharopoulos  (1985)  shows  social rates of return
of around 10%  even in the advanced  countries.
Of greater concern  is the suggestion  that the cross-section  studies  contain  many  flaws
leading to an upwards  bias in the estimates  (Behrman  and Birdsall,  1987  and Behrman, 1990)'.
Two studies in particular have attempted to correct for this bias. One important source  of bias
omitted from most studies is a measure  of the quality  of schooling  (see also below). Behrman  and
Birdsall  (1983,1985)  explored  this issue  for a sample  of males  in Brazil. 'he  sample  studied  exhibits
a private rate of return of 20.5%,  but adjusting  for quality (proxied by length of schooling  for
teachers),  the rate dropped  to 11.0%. (The  work  of Card and Krueger  (1992)  discussed  below  also
shows  that the return to education  is positively  correlated  with schooling  quality.)
A recent study  by Glewwe  (1991)  using  data from Ghana has also tried to overcome
problems  of bias in estimating  the return to education. This work takes account  of variation in
cognitive  ability and in school qualitys. He shows  that, with the omission  of variables  that are
positively  correlated  with  years  of schooling,  such  as school  quality  and family  background,  ordinary
least squares estimators  will be biased. His research is very critical  of the estimation  of rates of
return to additional  years of schooling.  Despite the concems  over his data voiced  in footnote 5
below, there can be little quarrel with his airgument  that the return arises to skills  and not to
schooling  per se. He concludes  that the private rate of return to education in Ghana is at most
around 6% p.a. and suggests  that 'rates of return to improvements  in school  quality"  are needed.
An implication  of his finding  is that other studies  of rates of return may provide  misleading  policy
recommendations  about educational  investment  programs.
There have been a number of other studies looking at the effects of education
quality,  although  most of these have  been carried out in the United States. In 1966  the influential
'Bennet, Glennester  and Nevison  (1992)  come to a similar  conclusion  for higher  education  in the United
Kingdom.  Their argument  is that higher  education  is  disproportionately  taken  up by  people  whose  background
would,  in any case,  tend to give  them access  to better-paid  jobs.
sOne  concern  about  the data used in Glewwe's  study  is that they  show  the average  duration  of schooling
to be 9.59 years. This compares  with OECD figures  for 1974  showing  lower figures  in Denmark,  France,
Germany,  Greece, Italy,  the Netherlands,  Norway,  Portugal,  Spain  and Sweden.  Only  Belgium,  Canada,  UK
and USA show  longer  schooling  duration.  Nevertheless  World  Development  epoPw4  1991 shows  40%  of the
population and 57%  of the female  population  as illiterate.  Even in 1988  only 73%  of the relevant  age  group
were enrolled  for primazy  education,  with  only  39% enrolled  for secondary  education.  It would  be interesting
to know  whether the survey  results have been cross-checked  with aggregate  data on school attendance.
Obviously  any inflation  of the number  of years of education  claimed  by the respondents  will  tend to depress
the estimated  return. Literacy  and numeracy,  if measured  as part of the survey  are much  less likely  to be
exaggerated.7
Coleman  Report found little association  between the quality  of schools  and student achievement
on standardized  tests.'  RIecent  research by Card and Krueger  (1992)  indicates,  however,  that a
large part of the significant  variation in the rate of return to education  in the U.S. is explained  by
differences  in the quality of schooling. For example,  the return is higher for individuals  whu
attended schools  with lower  pupil/teacher  ratios  and with  higher relative  teacher  salaries. They  also
find that the return is linked  to higher education  among  teachers.
An important policy  issue in development  economies  arises in the context of the
length  of compulsory  schooling. Angrist  and Krueger  (1991)  have undertaken  some  work  on this
in the context  of the U.S. Their results  point in the direction  of compulsory  schooling  laws  leading
to increases  in educational  attainment. They  do not, however,  answer  the question:  do compulsory
schooling  laws  benefit society? They  suggest  an answer  to this question requires  research into the
social and private costs of education.
Whether omitted variables  disrupt rate of return calculations  or not, there is the
separate problem that they do  not allow the  identification  of external effects on  economic
performance.  We therefore now turn to macroeconomic  studies which  should,  in principle,  show
any such effects.
2.2  Macroeconomic  Evience for Links between  Education  and Economic Growth
The approach  summarized  by Psacharopoulos  (1985)  has the drawback  that it fails
to reflect all externalities  arising  from higher education  and, conversely  that it is susceptible  to the
biases mentioned above. An alternative  means of identifying  the effects  of education  is to use a
regression  equation  to explain  cross-country  differences  in economic  growth,  or variations  in growth
rates in the same country  in different  periods.
Behrman  (1987)  finds a negative  but insignificant  correlation between the change
in literacy  and economic  growth  and Dasgupta  and Weale  (1992)  come  to a similar  conclusion.  But
it is questionable  whether  literacy,  even  if a good  indicator  of educational  attainment,  is measured
reliably  and this, on its own, should not be taken as evidence against a positive link between
education  and economic  performance.
Table 2 summarizes  some  studies, '  nh h use macroeconomic  data; regression  results
lining economic  growth  to education  and to other variables  are presented in table 3. McMahon
(1987)  claims to find a return of the order of 20% for investment  in education  in Africa.  This
'A survey  of the literature  can  be found  in Hanushek  (1986).8
estimate is calculated  from macroeconomic  data, assessing  the growth  in real GDP attributable  to
investment  in physical  and human capital.  There are a number  of problems  with his study.  His
method (table 3i) shows  a negative return to higher education.  If a longer lag is put on higher
education,  then the term in primary/secondary  education  loses its significance.  He calculates  the
return to primary  and secondary  education  from the first regression  in table 3i and the return to
higher education from the second regression,  adding the current and lagged terms on higher
education  together. This is somewhat  lacking  in coherence.  Thus his claim that his method shows
a return very  similar  to the figures  presented  by Psacharopoulos  for Africa  should  be regarded  with
skepticism.  If his claim  were true, it would  imply  that there is no benefit from education  except  that
reflected in those earnings differentials  which are  used to calculate the figures surveyed  by
Psacharopoulos  (1985),  or that the external  benefits  offset the biases referred to above.
The main  virtue of McMahon's  study is that he attempts to measure investment  in
human  capital  by means  of expenditure  on education  (including  earnings  foregone),  and this  allows
him  to interpret  his regression  coefficients  as rates  of return.  However,  these expenditure  data must
be subject  to a large inargin  of error, and this probably  explains  why,  in the other studies  in tables
2 and 3, enrolment  data were used instead.
Baumol,  Blackman  and Wolff  (1989)  find growth  in real GDP/GNPper  capita  to be
positively  influenced  by education  at all levels.  They explain  the growth  in per capita  GDP/GNP  by
a catch-up  effect  (expressed  by the use of initial GDP/GNP),  the rate of population  growth  and the
fraction of the appropriate age group enrolled in primary or  secondary  school or  in higher
education  in 1965.
Five regressions  are presented,  using  different  measures  of GDP/GNP  over slightly
different  periods,  but only one, looking  at real GNP in constant price dollars  begins  in 1965  and
so avoids  the risk of simultaneity  bias with the education  data; this is presented in table 3ii. An
increase  of 10% in the fraction  at primary  school  raises the level  per capita  GNP in 1984  by 4.2%
for a given  value of 1965  per capita  GNP. This suggests  an effect  on the growth  rate of 0.2'% p.a.
Secondary  education  is found  to be twice  as good,  with a figure  of 9.1%  over  20 years  or 0.46%  p.a.
Tertiary education  is even better. The figure is 11.3%  over 20 years  or 0.57%  p.a. These are the
results  of three separate regressions:  in those for secondary  and higher education  the population
growth variables  are not significant,  although  they become so with measures  of GDP based on
purchasing  power  parity.9
Table 2  Studies of the Return to Education  Calculated  from Macroeconomic  Data
McMahon  (1987)  Regression  on Growth  in  Increase  in  GDP  per  person
GDP per person employed  employed explained by  inputs of
labor and capital and expenditure
on primary  and secondary  education
(taken  together)  and  higher
education.
Baumol,  Blackman  and  Regression  on Growth  in  Growth in output of 103  countries
Wolf.  (1989)  GDP  per capita  1960- 85 per capita explained by
initial  GDP  per  capita  and
enrolment  rates  in  primary,
secondary and tertiary education.
GDP  evaluated  at  international
prices.
Barro (1991).  Regression  on Growth  in  Growth in output of 98 countries
GDP  per capita  1960-  85  per capita explained  by  initial
GDP  per capita,  enrolment rates in
primary and secondary  school, the
share of government consumption
in  GDP,  the  investment  ratio,
measures of  political and  social
instability, price  distortion  and
fertility.  Fertility rates are  also
explained
Wodd  Bank Development  Regression  on Growth  in  Growth in GDP of 68 economies
Report,  1991  GDP  the  period 1960-87 explained by
means of increases  in capital,  labor
and agricultural  land, and level  and
change in educational  attainment.
Mankiw,  Romer and  Regression  on Growth  in  Growth in output of 75 developing
Weil  GDP per working-age  person  countries  1960-85 explained by
(1992)  average  investment  ratio  and
average  fraction of  working-age
population  at secondary  school.10
Table 3  Regressions Explaining Economic Growth
I) McMahon. (1987,  p. 189)
Regeion  equatbn  for 30 Afdcn  Countris
j NIN  IVY  |  ,ff  J.|IJY  R|  IJS,_j__
AY/Y  NIN  -035  0.65  162  -5.02  Not given
(0.8)  (3.1)  (2.2)  (1.5)
AY/Y -hNN  -0O4  031  0.92  408  715  Not given
(2.4)  (13)  (05)  (11)  (20)
AY/Y - NN  GOrovtb in labor  productivity  for 30 Ark  countries am  the  five-year periodsl  1970-  75, 1975-80 &W1980-85S
U/Y  ibntent  ratio  for each  country  in the  fhnt year  of each  five-year  peiod
4HY  Invwstmet in education u  fradion of G}DP in the firt  year of each S-yer  period
IJY  Invatment  in higher education as fraction of ODP in the fint year of each S-year period.
Te  subscript -1 indIates  a 4g  of 5 yea.
Ihe  rrsin  incuded as other expltoy  vibles  initial  productivity,  changes  in utilization of capital rmtes,  dummies  for oil eaporters,  oil and drought
sbocks,  banae  (english  or french) an  a logged  dependent variabl.
4i)  BDumoL lacknan  a  Wolff (1989)
Regreuion equations eplanln  the ratio of 1981 to 1960  real GDP  per capta measured at 1975  international prices
ConDant  Initiel RODP  PrimarY  Secondary  Tertiary  R  _  Sample Size
-00t  4.599  0.791  0.273  103
(0.9)  (1.6)  (5.8)  _
0318  -1678  1386  0.227  103
(5.7)  (2.)  _  _  _  _  (4.7)  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
0375  40.627  2.703  0.094  103
(63)  (1.1)  (2.7)
ntli  RODP  ODP par capita in 1960
primay  primay shool  erolment  nte  in 1965
seconda  or  shoo  enolment  rate in 1965
trtiaty  hier  education enrolment rte  in 196S
i)  Buro  (1991.  p. 429)
Regreion  equatiom e.planIn  growth in rea  GD  per capita  1960.85  at an  nnual rate and fertility rate net of child deaths up to the age of 4.
cn  ODP  Prim.  Second-  9W  REV  ASS  PPI  Ly  FERT-  R  s
60  smy  a*  DEV  NET
0  -. 0072  040181  0.0225  4.119  4O19  -0.0315  -0.0119  0.068  0.59
9  (8.0)  (340)  (2.5)  (4.4)  (2.)  (1.7)  (2.1)  (2.1)
(3.2)  …………-
0.049  44)077  00t18  040100  4.114  0.0167  4O54  -0.0103  04064  44)043  0.62
4  (86)  (2.0)  (1.1)  (4A)  (2.6)  (15)  (1.7)  (2.0)  (3.1)
uhee  arns  in eat  * 
GROWTH  grwth  in per cita  GDP between 1960 and 1985  at 1985  pries  at an annual nte
ODP6O  ODPper  capit  in 1960  a  International  pries
Primay  prly  shoo  enrolment rate In 1960
Secday  seoday  chool enrobment rte  in 1960 ely  avep  ratio of gwvenmt  cotmmption (emduding  defence and eduation)  to GDP. 197045
REV  Aveap  nmber  of rolatbon  ad  cup  per year 196085.
ASS  N_mber of asunatior  per milon  population per year, 19608
PPIDiV  Deastion of prike of investment pods  from sample m  In 1960
Uty  Aera  ratio of domaetk Invetment to GDP, 1960-85
FERD7KF  No of chir  per wOmansu vivin beyond the ap  of 4. Avenge of 1960-85.11
to) Wwf Bak Dsw*p  tma  R.p^  199. p. 19.
R  _an equtio  espl  growth  In GDP ame the paod  196W09.
ZIC  ZL  ZH  DE03  DE39  E4O  R '
F  038  0.4  0.04  ONO  0.04  13  023,
(17-7)  (3A6)  (13)  ,,  (2.5,  (1-9)  (1.5)  '
ZK  cd_  In log  of utRized  capital 196047
ZH  chanp In log  agulturl  l4a  196047
ZL  chnp  in lbor  force,  196047
DE03  increue In  aveg  annual  yem of education  U  lvel  lne  from 0 to 3
DE39  iname  In wmg  annual  yoa  of edution  I  lewM ag  ftm  3 to 9
960  averag numbe  of yea  of educatn of popati  g  15-64  in 1960
v) MaNw. Romer and  Weil (1992 p. 429)
Regradon equation  Wlats. growth  in ra  ODP  per pewo of  woekg  age  196045
Co4n1t  In Y60  |  b(WDP)  In(n+g+d)  In (School)  I  R
309  .0372  0.506  .772  0.266  0.44
(5.8)  (5.)  (5.3)  _  ()  (33)
Vn  are  75 developing  countdes  in the re_0Duon  equtn.
Y60  ODP per pawn  of workg  age in 1960
IWDP  avee  ntio  of Invesment  to GDP. 196045
* sg4d  poputit  growth  rate  phis technil  proge  ad  deprestion  ate. (the ltter  two ae  asumed  to add to 0OAS)
School  fmncti  of 12-17  year olds attending  b  ady  scbool  smtiplied by faction  of workig-age  popubtion aged 15-19
ise  rgreflOn  is resticted so  that the coefdens  on the  vesdment  ratio, SCHOOL  ad  on the sm  of grwth of workgage  popultin  growth  ad
deprcitiDon  add to zeo.  w  restriction  is acpted  at a 42%  confidence L
It is difficult to interpret the results. Baumol, Blackmann and Wolff suggest that
higher education makes less of a contribution to economic growth than does secondary education
simply because the significance level associated with the variable is lower. They do not discuss the
fact that the coefficient itself is higher. The most natural way to compare the effects of the three
types of education would be to place aU three variables in a single regression equation. This would
allow  one to test and perhaps then impose the hypothesis that aU  three types of education have the
same effect on growth. One cannot, from their results, anticipate the outcome of this test.
The second study is provided by Barro (1991). He presents a number of regression
explaining growth in  GDP per capita of  a wide range of countries  by a  number of variables
describing education and political and social stability. The equation in table 3iii suggests that an
increase of 10% points in the fraction of the school-age population attending secondary school
raises the per capita growth rate of GDP by 0.2% p.a. A similar increase in the growth rate is
achieved by a 10% point increase in the fraction of the school-age population attending primary12
school, so that a  10% point increase in the fraction of the age group processed  by both school
systems will add 0.4% p.a. to the per capita growth rates.
However the inclusion of two types of extra factors reduces the apparent  effect of
education. The inclusion of fertility as an explanatory variable halves the influence of both types
of education and leaves them statistically insignificant. One should not worry too much about this.
It is subsequently argued that fertility is likely to be a function of education, and indeed one of
Barro's regressions shown in table 5 suggests that this is indeed the case. An implication of this is
that the equation including the effects of fertility suffers from simultaneous equation bias, and the
reduced form which excludes it is to be preferred.
The introduction of dummy variables for Africa and Latin America in addition to
fertility has the effect of reducing the coefficient on secondary education to close to zero (0.04%
growth for 10% increase in the share of the population at secondary education) but  raising the
coefficient on primary education to 0.15% p.a. for a 10% point increase in the share of the age
group at primary school. Once again it may be that, if the coefficients were restricted to be equal,
a significant term would be found. One might conjecture that the total direct effect of education
on growth would be of the order  of 0.2% p.a. per  10% increase in the population,  but if the
endogenous effects of fertility changes are taken into account then the figure of around  0.4% p.a.
may become more relevant.
The role played by the dummy variables for Latin America and Africa is not clear.
One interpretation consistent with the model is that the quality of education there is worse than
elsewhere, and one way of correcting for this would be to look at expenditure on education rather
than  participation  rates  as  explanatory variables.  On  the  other  hand,  of  course,  the  Latin
America/Africa effect may be quite independent of schooling and omission of the dummy variable
simply biases upward the education variables.
World Development Repoit, 1991 presents  a  regression which explains growth in
output by means of growth in inputs and by the initial level of education of the workforce, and the
increase  in  educational  attainment  of  the  workforce in  the  period  under  study. In  fact five
regressions  are  presented.  Some of  these  include variables  representing  the  effects of  price
distortions, but  the inclusion of these variables does not  have much effect on the  coefficients
estimated for the variables shown in table 3iv), and these are therefore taken from the regression
without the effects of price distortions. The regression investigates  whether expansion of 0 to 3 level
education has effects different from those of 3 to 9 level education. Although a higher coefficient
is found on 0 to 3 level education, it is not significantly  higher. The initial level of education is not13
statistically significant, although, converting to an annual growth rate, it does appear, dividing the
estimated coefficient of 13 by the 27 years of the period, that one extra year of education in 1960
raises the growth rate of a developing country by 0.48% p.a. over the period 1960-87.  This term can
be regarded as representing a pure externality effect, with a higher level of education raising the
rate at which technical progress is possible. It  compares with a statistically significant figure of
0.14% p.a.  found by Weale (1992) for the  developed countries. The  coefficients on increased
availability of education have no counterpart in Barro's study. Nevertheless, the World  Development
Report study suffers from the presence of a number of poorly determined coefficients, and the
imposition of some theoretical restrictions, similar to those applied to the study discussed next,
would help in the interpretation of the results.
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) present the results of an exercise similar to those
of Baumol and  World Development Report, 1991, but with fewer explanatory variables, and using
what is probably a less satisfactory measure of educational attainment. They explain the increase
in output per person of working age between 1960 and 1985 by means of 1960 output per person
of worldng age, the average investment ratio, the increase in population and the average fraction
of the workforce attending secondary school (SCHOOL), with all variables being expressed in
logarithms. Dividing their coefficients by 25 to convert them to explain growth at an annual rate,
the coefficient on SCHOOL falls to 0.011 and that on the log investment rate to 0.020. However
one must also divide Mankiw,  Romer and Weil's coefficients by the sample means in order  to
make them comparable with those figures estimated in levels rather than logs. With an average of
around 20% of the product invested, Mankiw, Romer and Weil's coefficient on investment would
be comparable to a figure of 0.1 in Barro's equatioti.
It is still not possible to make a direct comparison of the education effects because
Mankiw, Romer and Weil look at the fraction of the working-age population attending secondary
school and not at the fraction of the school-age population attending secondary school. However,
if we assume that 38% of the relevant age group attended secondary school over the period (being
the mean of the  1960 and 1985 figures quoted by Barro), then the coefficient of 0.011 must be
divided by 0.38 to make it comparable with Barro's. The resulting figure, of 0.027 is higher than
Barro's  estimate of 0.018, but it must be  remembered that Mankiw, Romer and Weil omit any
effect from expansion of primary education. If expansion of primary education is correlated with
that of secondary education, then their regression would be expected to overstate the effects of
secondary education. One might also be concemed that they use average school attendance during
the sample period, and there is a risk of simultaneity bias arising from interaction between this and
output growth. Furthermore, the analysis  of section 4 implies that there is also a risk of simultaneity
between education and population growth, suggests the desirability of using instrumental variables.14
As was also noted in the discussion  of Barro's results,  without  this one cannot  be confident  that the
regression  provides  a satisfactory  estimate of the effect of education  on growth.
Nevertheless,  an important  aspect of Mankiw,  Romer and Weil's  results is that the
restriction  which  they test and impose,  that the coefficients  of the investment  ratio, SCHOOL  and
the sum  of population  growth,  technical  progress  and depreciation  add to zero, has the implication
that there are no spatial externalities  linking education  to economic  growth. This is discussed
further in section  4.
It has been  argued  that the World  Development  Report,  1991  regression  is inconclusive
as to whether there is an externality  present or not, but one should also ask whether of Barro's
figures, which include both primary and secondary education in  the  regression, suggest an
extemality.  His figures  can be compared  with the results found by Weale (1992)  in the developed
world.  In this study an increase  of one year in the average  number of years  of education  of the
workforce  raised the rate of growth  ofper  capita GDP by 0.14%.  Since  the average  number  of years
of education of the workforce  in the sample of countries considered was just over 9, this is
equivalent  to an increase  of 11% in the fraction  of the population  attending a 10-year  schooling
program. Alternatively,  a 10% increase  in secondary-school  throughput  would  be associated  with
an increase  in the growth  rate of 0.127%  p.a.
If one assumes that fertility  effects are of no great importance  in the developed
world,  Weale's figure appears to be below Barro's estimate of 0.23%  p.a. But the nature of the
effects  identified  by Barro merits  some  discussi6n.  In fact his figures  represent  two effects,  a stock
effect and a flow  effect. It is clear from his dala that school  enrollments  have been rising  during
the period of his sample. As the number of educated people rises, so will the level of output.
Denison (1967) suggests a rule of thumb that one extra year of education adds 5% to labor
productivity  up to  the  eighth year of education. Beyond that,  one extra year adds 8% to
productivity.  Barro's data indicate  a sharp increase  in the fraction  of the school-age  group enrolled
at school  between 1950  and 1985,  and it is therefore reasonable  to assume that the fraction  of the
workforce  with primary  and secondary-school  training  was rising  rapidly  during  the period studied
(1960-85).  It is likely  that the increase in the fraction of the work-force  qualified is positively
correlated  with the fraction  of the school-age  cohort enrolled  in 1960,  because  all the developing
countries  probably  built  up education  from a low  base in the 1930s  and 40s.  This means  that at least
a part of the effect  of education  on growth  identified  by Barro is a consequence  of the direct  effect
of increased education  on earning power. On the other hand Weale's figures  were intended to
represent only  an external  effect  whereby  education  raises the rate at which  innovation  is taken on15
board.  This 'endogenous  growth'  mechanism  is discussed  by  Lucas  (1988)  and is described  in section
4. It is combined  with the stock-adjustment  effect  in Barro's results.
The importance  of the stock-adjustment  effect is demonstrated  in the Appendix.
There a demographic  model  is described  in which  the population  has a life expectancy  of 57. It is
growing  at 2% p.a., so the median  age of the population  is only 28. An increase  in the fraction  of
the secondary  school cohort from 0.23 to 0.53 of the cohort group over a 25-year period (for
comparison  with Barro's results  for 1960-85)  raises  the effective  labor force  by 5-8%  more than the
increase in the actual labor force. In the Appendix  it is demonstrated  that this would imply a
coefficient  on the share at secondary  education  of 0.12  to 0.18  for a 10%  increase  in participation.
This compares  with Barro's figure of 0.23. However,  it can be seen that the coefficient  emerging
from the stock-adjustment  effect, when added to Weale's estimate of the external endogenous
growth  effect,  gives  a figure  of 0.25-0.31  which  is above  that identified  by Barro. These calculations
are consistent  with the higher, but less well-determined  estimate of the effect of the level of
education  on growth  presented by Wodld  Development  Report,  1991,  but they imply  that the return
estimates  presented by Psacharopoulos  (1985)  are almost  certainly  too high. They  would  require
a coefficient  considerably  higher than Barro's even without any externality  present. The overall
return implied  is also still some  way below the figures presented McMahon's  (1987)  study. The
reasons for this ought to be investigated  because education  expenditure,  used by McMahon  ought
to be a better indicator  of investment  in human  capital  than are enrolment  rates or number  of years
of education  of the workforce.
The  evidence on  the  return  to  ,ducation  is  summarized in  table  4.  The
macroeconomic  evidence  is consistent  with external  growth  effects  arising  from education  only if
the direct return to education  is well  below  the figures  of 15%  or more emerging  from some  cross-
section studies.  The studies which  look at macroeconomic  effects  do not test for the presence  of
scale extemalities.  These might be indicated  by non-linear  relationships  between education and
economic  performance  and investigation  of this might help to clarify  the picture.16
Table 4  Estimates of the Return to Education
i) Rates of Return  13-27%  Primary  education  at top of range.
Psacharopoulos  (1985)  Higher  education  at bottom.
World  Development  Report 1991  5-25%  More recent surveys  than those
quoted by Psacharopoulos.
Behrman  and Birdsail  (1983,  1985)  11%  Quality-corrected  survey  data.
Glewwe  (1991)  <6%  Abilty-corrected  survey  data.
McMahon  (1987)  20%  Cross-country  regression
ii) Effects  of Education  Enrolment  Rates on Growth  Rate
Baumol,  Blackman  and Wolff  (1989)  0.038  (Primary),  0.066  (Secondary),  0.129  (Tertiary)
regression  coefficients  converted  to annual rates
Barro (1991)  0.018  (Primary),  0.023  (Secondary).
Mankiw,  Romer and Weil (1992)  0.027  (secondary)  regression  coeffic-zjt  converted  to
annual rate and divided by 0.38 to  convert to  a
coefficient on  the  fraction of  the  school-age
population  attending  secondary  school.
iii) Effects  of Educational  Attainment  of Workforce  on Growth  Rate
World  Development  Report,  1991.  OA8  on ye 1ars  of education  in 1960.  0.09 on increase
in years  of education  in level  0 to 3. 0.04  on increase
in  years of education  level  3 to level  9. The figure  of
0A8  is expressed  at an annual  rate.
2.3  Education and Fefit
While it is not proven that rapid population growth is undesirable, there is a general
air of concern over the expansion of the world population (Ehrlich, 1971). It is an empirical fact
that educational improvements have been associated with declining fertility rates.  This is partly a
consequence of education lowering poverty, as the  latter is associated with high fertility rates
(World Development Report, 1990).  Psacharopoulos and  Woodhall (1985) in their review of the
literature  suggest a  number of ways by which education can influence fertility. It may change
perceptions of the costs and benefits of having children, and it also influences the age of marriage
and reduces the infant mortality rate. Education may also change attitudes to contraception. The
evidence suggests that the effect of education depends on the average level of education of the
population  as well as on the level of education of the individuals concerned.  In countries with17
literacy  rates above 60%, high education  appeared to be associated  with reduced fertility,  while
where the literacy rate is below  40%, high education appeared to be associated  with increased
fertility.  Thus  increases  in school  enrolment  rates  were initially  associated  with increases  in fertility,
and it seems that the enrolment rate has to rise above 75% before a sustained  decline can be
anticipated.  The average  developing  country  is now  well  over this threshold  (see footnote 11,  p.38)
Psacharopoulos  and Woodhall  arrived at the following  conclusions. Education  is
unlikely  to reduce fertility  in all circumstances.  It seems  that the initial conditions  vis-a-vis  literacy
are especially  important. Thus, for the least  literate societies  evidence  points in the direction  that
increments  in education  lead to increases  in fertility. Nevertheless,  in the long run it is usually  the
case that increasing  education  will  ultimately  reduce  fertility. Education  of females,  especially  girls,
is usually  more effective  at affecting  fertility  than educating  males. Finally,  education  is more likely
to reduce  fertility  in urban areas than in rural areas. The link between  education  and fertility  is not
straightforward,  but, at the levels of education found in most developing  countries nowadays,
education  does appear to be a force  reducing  fertility.
What is needed in this area is a better understanding  of the economics  of household
and family  development. Caldwell  (1982)  presents  a theory for fertility  decline  based on the costs
of rearing  children. He presents  an analysis  of how  households  evaluate  the costs and benefits of
having children.  Not surprisingly,  to explain a declining  fertility rate it is suggested that the
expected  costs  of having  a child  increase  with education,  with  proportionate  changes  in the benefits
not offsetting  this. This is argued to be related to both the indirect  costs (opportunity  costs) and
the direct costs of education,  fees, etc.  This approach is similar in spirit to the human capital
model,  see Becker (1964). The World  Development  Report  1990,  however,  suggests  that the most
effective  way to deal with high fertility  rates is to improve  family  planning  services.
The results  of careful  cross-section  studies  are presented  by Rosenzweig  (1990).  He
suggests  that fertility  of landless  laborers  in India in 1971  is positively-linked  to child wages  and to
adult male wages but negatively-linked  to adult female wages. Mother's schooling  was not an
important influence in the results of this study. It is not clear, however,  whether fertility is
responding to  the difference between wage rates for educated and uneducated labor. School
enrolment  rates respond  negatively  to child  wages  and positively  to fathers'  wages  but, once again
the results do not actually  indicate  how  they respond to the return to education.
Perhaps the best cross-section  evidence  for a link between the return to education
and fertility  is offered  by Rosenzweig's  assessment  of the green revolution.  In areas covered  by the
Intensive  Agricultural  Development  Program  (IADP) the return to education  seems to have  been18
raised, although  it is not clear  that the change  is statistically  significant.  In the same  areas there was
a marked reduction  in fertility.  The fraction  of the relevant  cohort with no primary schooling  fell
by slightly  more in the IADP areas than in the other areas (but since the initial fraction  was
smaller,  the percentage reduction  in non-education  was much  larger).
These data cannot  be said to be very  precise  but they do provide  supporting  rather
than contradictory  evidence  for the view  that parents see increased  human  capital per child as a
substitute  for numbers  of children  and that their willingness  to substitute  human  capital per child
for children depends on the return to education.  It is also suggested  that the magnitude  of the
effect  may  be restricted  by the costs of fertility  control.
Complementing  these  studies  are macroeconomic  analyses.  These  pick  up the inverse
relationship  between investing  in human  capital  and investing  in children  and extend the analysis
to the whole  economy  by integrating  these decisions  with the consumption/saving  decision.  The
model presented by Barro and Becker (1989)  is discussed  in detail in sections  3 and 4 with the
results of simulation  experiments.  The cross-country  macroeconomic  evidence is discussed  after
these simulations.  Rosenzweig  (1988)  makes  the point that macroeconomic  comparisons  generally
suggest much more powerful  links than do survey-based  results and the reason for this is not
completely  clear. The survey-based  results may be missing effects which are  external to the
individual  but internal  to the country  or the coefficients  may  be biassed  due to measurement  error.
On the other hand the cross-country  studies may well  suffer from omitted variable  bias, so that
effects  are being attributed to education  rather than to some other variables.
Barro (1991)  studies the economic  factors  which  influence  fertility  rates. He finds
from the cross-section  of countries that an increase of 10% of the relevant  age group attending
primary school  reduces the number of children  bom to each woman by 0.13.  An increase  of the
secondary  school population  by 10% of the cohort reduces the fertility  rate by 0.26. The infant
mortality  rate (deaths up to the age of 4) is an explanatory  variable, but the effect is not very
different  if the net fertility  rate (number  of children  surviving  to the age of 4) is studied instead.
The level of GDP in 1960 is included as a regressor. This is not statistically  significant  unless
dummies  are included for Latin America  and Africa;  there is, however,  no obvious reason why
dummies  should  be introduced  for these regions.  When the latter dummies  are present the effect
of primary  education  on fertility  rises from  0.13 to 0.16  children  while  that of secondary  education
falls  from 0.26 to 0.24;  it does not, therefore change  markedly  the conclusions  to be drawn from
this about the effect  of education  on fertility.  Barro  does not test the restriction  that the coefficients
on both types  of education  are equal and it is not possible  to do this with the results  as they are
presented, but, in view  of the t-statistics  shown,  it would  probably  be accepted.19
Table  5  Education and Fertility
Rebson  eplaninS  Fe,ity  Buaro  (p. 423)
Cons  ODP  Prim-  Second-  n-y  REV  ASS  FF
- 60  my  . _  DEV  R
6.08  *0.105  -156  -3.01  1.0  -0.13  1.45  0.40  0.72
(05)  (0.069  (0.41)  (059)  (13)  (032)  (035M)  (0.26)
Time are 98 observations  in each regression
FUTNEF  No of chidren per woan  savin  bqeond the age of 4. Aenge  of 1960.85.
ODP60  ODP pw  capI* in 1960  at internatoal  pricn
primay  pray  school erolment  rate in 1960
Seeoy  econdaw  y school enrobment  rate in 1960
Xly  avenge ntio  of govrnment consumption (eacluding  defence  nd education) to ODP. 197045
REV  Avenge numnber  of revolutions  and  Cmps per year. 196085.
ASS  Number of asussinations per  mlion population pe  year. 196085
PPIDEV  Deviation  of price  of Invetment  goods  from  sample  nmea  In 1960
Neither the model nor Barro's data distinguish  the education  of men from the
education of women. Psacharopoulos  and Woodhall (1985) argue that in practice there are
important differences/.  The model focuses  on education  as affecting  the cost of raising  children
through reducing  the labor time that they have available  for work, but there are likely  to be a
number of other important  effects.  First of all the desire and the ability  to control fertility  are not
the same thing. A reasonable level of education may be necessary  for women to be able to
understand the consequences  of fertility  control. Secondly,  in societies  where women are poorly
educated,  fertility  decisions  may  be made  by men  who  do not regard the costs  of bearing  and raising
children  in quite the same light as do women.  Thirdly,  the return to education  of women may  be
different  from that of men  because  women  are likely  to drop out of the labor force  for at least part
of their working  lives.  The willingness  of parents  to educate  their daughters  may  depend  on whether
society  functions  by means of a dowry  or whether the effects  of education  can be capitalized  into
a bride price.
2.4  Education and Health
The relationship  between  education  and health has been discussed  by Cochrane  et
al. (1980) and more recently  by Kenkel (1991)  and Gomes-Nato  et al. (1992). Education feeds
through  to influencing  health  by its affects  on mortality  rates, disease  and nutrition. The Cochrane
et al. study found education to be an important  variable  in stemming  disease  and thus reducing
mortality  rates. The effect  was found  to be even stronger  than per capita income  and doctors  per
7Although  it cannot  be said  that  the  results  presented  by  Rosenzweig  (1990)  and  discussed  above  support
this  view.20
capita.  One of the strongest relationships in this area is that between parental, in particular the
mother's,  education and  a  child's health.  As Psacharopoulos and  Woodhall (1985) note "The
evidence is unequivocal: educated parents, particularly mothers, have better-nourished children who
are less likely to die in infancy  than the children of uneducated parents. On average, one additional
year of schooling for a mother results in a reduction of 9 per  1,000 in child or infant mortality."
This conclusion is reached not from a single regression equation but from the pooling of a number
of cross-section studies.
Although the evidence of a correlation is clear, the direction of causality is not so
apparent.  For example, better educated mother's may generate higher incomes and therefore the
household  may find itself with improvements in nutrition  and other  factors.  The  interaction
between health and education is complex. Grossman (1972) suggested that schooling increases the
efficiency of household health production, which was subsequently supported by empirical studies
by Grossman (1976) and Berger and Leigh (1989). Fuchs (1982), however, argues that people with
different  levels of  schooling probably differ in  unobservable ways, such as  their  rate  of time
preference.  It is suggested that good health might be a consequence of the unobservables rather
than good schooling. The recent studies by Kenkel (1991) and Gomes-Nato et al. (1992) provide
some new insights into this relationship.  They focus on the complementarities that exist between
health and schooling, an issue which has also been addressed by Leslie and Jamison (1990) and
Lockheed and Verspoor (1991).
Kenkel (1991) examines the relationship by focusing  on the inputs into a household's
production of  health.  The  hypothesis that  he  tests  is whether  schooling improves allocative
efficiency, that is the choice of inputs, by improving individuals' health knowledge.  He tests the
hypothesis on 1985 U.S. data and estimates the separate effects of health knowledge and schooling
on consumption of cigarettes, alcohol and exercise.  (In the developing economy context other
variables, such as cooking  techniques, water treatment, etc. could be considered as well.) His results
suggest that schooling's effect on the allocative efficiency of the household production of health is
not the main reason schooling is linked to health.  He claims that the observed correlation might
be due to unobservable differences across individuals, as suggested by Fuchs (1982).
The Gomes-Nato et al. study is an empirical one making use of a unique panel data
set from northeast Brazil.  Their main finding is that nutrition and health strongly affect student
grade  performance  and  student  achievement. Because well-nourished children  perform  more
satisfactorily, it is suggested  that  school  feeding programs  could be  used to  improve overall
educational  attainment  levels.  Thus educational  expenditures  in  developing countries  should21
account for amounts devoted to feeding programs. The World  Development  Report 1990  cites
several  studies demonstrating  a clear connection  between nutrition  and learning  capacities.
Table  6  Studies of the Link between  Education  and Health
Cochrane  et al. (1980).  Survey  of Range of  The studies looked at the link between
Studies  parental education and child mortality.
Data for 17 countries  were studied.  A
significant  relationship  was found in all
but two. In a further 7 studies controls
were made for other variables such as
income  or indicators  of income.
Kenkel  (1991).  The Effects  of Education  Survey  of  health  knowledge  and
on Health in USA  behavior.  14,177 males  and  19,453
females  surveyed  in 1985  by the Health
Promotion/Disease  Prevention
supplement  to  the  1985  Health
Interview  Survey.
Gomes-Nato,  Hanushek, Survey  of 1516  students  in  Study looked at  effects of  health on
Leite  and  Frota-  Brazil  in  1985.  387  school  performance.
Bezzera.  surveyed  in 1987.
(1992).
It would  be desirable  that these studies should  be complemented  by cross-country
comparisons  similar to those used to assess education,  fertility  and growth.  Dasgupta and Weale
(1992)  provide  preliminary  evidence  to suggest  that health improvements  are linked  with economic
improvements  but more work needs to be done in this area.
Swnma*y
This survey  of studies of the effect of education  leads to a number of important
conclusions.  First of all there is very  little doubt  that education  is associated  with  increased  earning
power  for individuals.  Nevertheless  there are reasons  for believing  that an estimated  return of 20%
p.a. or more from one year of schooling  is too high.  The estimates  are calculated  in a way  which
does not adjust for quality, does not reflect the fact that the return comes from literacy and
numeracy skills  rather than from education per se, and does not take account  of the fact that
people from a more advantageous  background  are more likely  to be educated.  Macroeconomic
analyses  of the links  between education  and growth  are consistent  with an external  benefit linking22
education to growth in productivity  over and above the productivity  effects internal to the educated,
only if direct rates of return are considerably lower than those shown by the cross-section studies.
There are well-documented effects linking education to health, but, from the global
perspective, much more important external effects of education are almost certainly its influence
on fertility and on technical progress; it is desirable to examine these externalities further. In the
next section a model is explained which treats  fertility as a choice variable of the same type as
consumption  and  saving. Study of  this model  sheds light on  the  nature  of  the  link between
education and fertility. The model lends itself happily to an analysis of this at the same time as the
link between education and productivity is being investigated.
3.  A Model of Fertility, Investment and  Externalities from Education
The  previous  sections have discussed the  evidence that  there  is  link between
education attainment, fertility and economic growth generated by technical progress. Further, it was
suggested that the link between education and fertility might well be an economic link, with the
fertility decision being linked to the consumption/saving decision. This suggests that it might be
helpful to explore further the linkages between education, fertility and technical progress by means
of a formal model. Simulation of this model allows one to understand the nature of the externalities
which link education to fertility and technical progress. This section develops the model presented
by Barro and Becker (1988, 1989) in order to investigate these links. The model offers a formal
explanation of why there should be a link between education and fertility. It demonstrates that the
rate  of  fertility is  inversely related  to  the  level of  education. At  low levels of  education  a
combination of low productivity and high fertility point to  a Malthusian nightmare.
The model is set out in stages. First of all Barro and Becker's model is described.
Parameter values are chosen and simulations are carried out in order to investigate the sensitivity
of the solution to these parameters. The model is then extended in two stages. In section 3.4, a
human capital model of investment in education is integrated with the model. This makes it possible
to illustrate the observed link between fertility and education, making the assumption that technical
progress is exogenous. In section 4, the model is extended further, so that the rate of growth is
dependent on the duration of education. The simulation properties are investigated and the links
between education, technical progress and fertility are found to be broadly consistent with Barro's
(1991) results.
The model assumes that populations grow by means of pathogenesis, but that the
fertility rate  is an endogenous variable. The supply side of the model is not very controversial;
output is produced by means of labor and capital; labor is supplied inelastically,  but the availability23
of labor depends on the time households spend looking after children and  that children spend
undergoing education broadly defined. The utility function which determines the choice between
spending and  saving is more unusual.  As discussed by Meade (1966) parents show a degree of
altruism for their offspring: they pay the costs of rearing them and they aim to leave them a bequest
of capital; this  influences strongly parents'  saving and in fact has the implication that  children
become a substitute for capital accumulation.
The  most controversial aspect of the  model is that  reproduction  is seen  as  an
economic decision. Parents choose how many children to have with the aim of maximizing their
utility function, bearing in mind the costs of rearing children. One can think of each agent in the
ith generation as maximizing a dynastic welfare function, which arises from a process of infinite
regress. Each agent is concerned about the welfare of its children. It is not directly concerned about
the welfare of its grandchildren, but this does matter because they influence the welfare of the
children, and the outcome of this is that dynastic welfare depends on the consumption of all future
generations weighted by the extent of the altruism that each generation has for its children.
At the same time, less unusually, there is a dynastic budget constraint which says
simply that the discounted value of the dynastic income must equal the discounted sum of dynastic
expenditure including the cost of raising children, and a production function of a conventional form
which shows the output  arising from  inputs of  labor  and  capital. Barro  and  Becker  assume
exogenous Harrod-neutral technical progress.
From these building blocks an endogenous fertility rate can be  calculated. In the
steady state, in which wage rates and the cost of child-rearing are both growing at constant rates,
it turns out that the fertility rate depends positively  on the degree of altruism (the extent to which
parents derive utility from their children's utility) and on the rate of interest, but negatively on the
rate of technical progress. These two effects can be easily understood. A high rate of interest raises
the cost of future consumption (and future utility) compared with current utility. Children offer an
alternative means of future utility. A high rate of growth must go with a reduction  in fertility
because, at  any rate of  interest,  they are  both  associated with greater  preference  for present
consumption.
Models of this type are obviously open to the objection that they imply a greater
degree of planning and awareness of the future than is believed to be the case, particularly among
poorly educated people in underdeveloped countries. But there is little doubt that people do see
children as a means of saving if only to provide for them in their old age, and it is also clear that
people are concerned about the welfare of their children. The great advantage of this model is that24
it considers  jointly  saving  in the form of capital  goods and saving  in the form of children.  The use
of a dynastic  utility function has the implication  that people are implicitly  concerned  about the
welfare  of their distant descendants.  But if only  the utility  of parents  and children  were considered,
it would be necessary  to modify  the budget constraint by including  a target terminal value of
children's  bequest,  and this would  introduce  an arbitrary element.
Here the Barro-Becker  model  is extended  by the introduction  of choice about the
duration of education  and by the assumption  that the overall  level of labor productivity  depends
on the cumulated total of past education,  so that the growth rate becomes  endogenous  in the
manner described  by Lucas (1988).  The extension  set out here is designed  for comparative  static
analysis,  and it is therefore considerably  simpler than the dynamic  model described  by Becker,
Murphy  and Tamura (1990)  (see section  3.4); it is subsequently  also argued that the extensions
made here are more realistic  than those  of Becker,  Murphy  and  Tamura.  In common  with empirical
evidence,  it represents  the main  cost  of education  as being  the opportunity  for child  labor foregone,
so that the duration  of education  chosen  by the rational  parent depends  on the return to education
relative  to the interest rate and trend growth  rate. The trend rate of growth  is directly  proportional
to the duration of education chosen by the rational parent but, since the effect on growth is
external,  the rational  parent forms its choice  taking  the rate of growth  as given.
The steady-state  properties  of the model are investigated  by means of simulation
using  imposed  parameter  values,  and the sensitivity  of the result  to these  parameters  is investigated.
Conclusions  are drawn about the  mechanisms  by which  education  may have effects  on fertility,
fixed  investment  and economic  growth.
3.1  he  Barro-Becker  Model
First of all the model is explained  and parameter sensitivity  is explored. Each
household  head in the ith generation  is assumed  to derive  utility  from its consumption  and that of
its ni direct descendants
U=c;  +a.n'U. 1 (1)
where aniE is the utility  that each parent derives  from the utility  of each child. With  e>O  it can be
seen that it is declining  in the number  of children.  a measures  the utility  which  a parent would  gain
from the utility  of a single  child and can be described  as an altruism  parameter. The elasticity  of
utility  with respect  to consumption  is o>0.25
Each household head also faces a budget constraint, which states that total income,
from wages w' and capital r,;  plus initial endowment, k, can be spent on consumption, c,: or on
the costs of raising children (1'  per child) or providing an endowment (ki+1) per child.
w' +(1  +r,)k  -c; +nP(P  +.  k)  (2)
The optimization problem is best considered in terms of the dynastic utility function
UO=E"  aINc  (3)
where N  =  r 1 ,,,"  n, and is the size of the ith generation descended from a single household head
in the 0th generation. This dynastic utility  function is maximized  subject to the intertemporal budget
constraint
.<+=,1  dw;  ==,l  dXNc,*  +N,.  I  P;)(4
where di =  .T7  i (I + rJ and is the discount factor showing  the present discounted value of one
unit of expenditure by generation i  The budget constraint shows the present value of the initial
endowment, ko,  plus dynastic labor income equal to the discounted value of total consumption and
the total discounted costs of raising children.
Utility is maximized  for each value of N, (and thus n,) and c,* separately. Each
generation makes its own choice taking the choices of the other generations as given, making the
solution a Nash equilibrium. This optimization exercise leads to equations for consumption and for
the rate of fertility.These two equations taken together are shown to lead to a consumption function
Ce=  o  e  PI (1  +r)-wI1  (5)
while the fertility rate also depends on the costs of raising children and the degree of altruism as
well as the wage rate and interest rate
n slg(l+r,+,)1[  3 1(1+r)-wiO  (6)
p;(1  +r 1,, 1)-w 1,1
The production structure must now be specified. Here  it is necessary to be  more
specific than Barro  and  Becker, because the model is to be  solved subsequently, and a Cobb-26
Douglas production function for output per effective worker is therefore assumed. Growth at rate
g is assumed to be labor-augmenting technical progress. For the time being, both the level of labor
productivity and  the  growth  rate  are  taken  to  be  exogenous. The  level of  output  gross  of
depreciation is y and is a function f of the capital stock per worker
yi  =(I  +g)'(kj  /(1  +S)^)17
With exogenous growth at rate g, one actual worker is equivalent to (I +g)' effective workers. It then
follows that the consumption level, capital stock and wage rate per effective worker are simply
linked to their actual values.
c  -c;/(1  +g);  ki=k,/(l  +g)';  w,-w,/(1l8)'  (8)
With a rate of depreciation of capital, A, the normal relations for the rate of interest and the wage
rate hold
ri  -f l(kd-Ak,;  w,-[Akd-k11(k)-Ak  (9)
The cost of rearing each child, fli, is specified in terms of goods input, a, and labor time, b, per unit
of effective labor, with ,Ij  being the absolute cost per worker
P =a+bw,=PI3(l  +8)'  (10)
with the assumptions that each adult spends a fraction b of his available labor time rearing each
child and that the goods input needed to raise each child grows in line with the exogenous growth
in labor productivity.
The budget constraint for generation i can be set out again in terms of effective  units
of labor (after dividing by (I +g)i)
(I -bnd[w,  +U  +r,)k,]  c,+n,[a+(l  +S)(1  -bn,.,)k, ,l  11
This says that the output per unit of labor (man-hour or rather  man-generation),
multiplied by the fraction of available time which is devoted to labor rather than to child-bearing,
is equal to consumption plus the goods which are taken up in rearing children plus the bequests
whicS have to be left to children. These bequests depend not only on the number of children, but
also on the rate of growth, because everything is defined in terms of effective units of labor. They
are multiplied by the fraction of time available which the ith generation devotes to work rather than
to raising its nj+, ^hildren.27
The dynamic path described by these equations is of some complexity,  because they
form a non-linear differential system. However, a great  deal of useful analysis can be  done by
exploring the properties of the model in steady states. This will allow us to come to some view
about the effects of changes in the rate of growth or in the cost of rearing children on fertility and
fixed investment.
In the  steady state,  the time  subscripts may be  dropped  and  the rate  of  labor
productivity growth becomes  simply a  function of  the  level of expenditure  on  child-rearing.
Equation (6) reduces to a simple form for the fertility rate
n=  a(1+r)  (12)
(1 +8)l0
suggesting that, with a constant rate of interest, higher growth will  be associated with lower fertility.
Of course, this partial analysis may not survive once the effects of a change in the rate of growth
on the interest rate are taken into account.
The second equation which drives the model is the intertemporal budget constraint
(11). Consumption is eliminated using (5) so that the budget constraint becomes
k)  +k-  v  [  1  +r-w]+n[P+(1+g)kl  bnk[i  +r-n(1+g)]  (13)
1-C-o  1+g
One can then substitute for w, r and f(k) using the production function and its derivatives and for
p8  using equations (10), so that, with suitable parameter values, the model can be solved.
Before  presenting  this  solution, one  point  about  the  model  should be  noted.
Equation  (1) implies that, in the steady state dynastic utility is given as
U  c  (14)
1  -anl:-
Combining this with the expression for the rate of fertility implies that,  for dynastic utility to be
bounded
(I  +r)>n(I  +g)  1
This is the standard result that the rate of growth, n(l+g),  must be below the rate of interest. But
there is a second implication of equation (14). A social planner who aimed to maximize  the dynastic28
utility function would do so by raising pursuing policies which raised the rate of fertility to the point
where dynastic utility became infinite. In using this model, one must  therefore  be  cautious of
interpreting the value of the dynastic utility function as a measure of welfare.
3.2  Parameter Values  and the Model Solution
A certain amount of care is necessary in the choice of parameter values and in the
interpretation of the results of the model is necessary  because the period is a generation rather than
a year. In order to interpret the results in a more conventional framework, one can assume that the
generation lasts for 25 years. This means that a depreciation rate of 5% p.a. of the fixed capital
stock turns into a depreciation factor of 72%. A growth rate of 0.5% p.a. in the population or the
efficiency of labor turns into 13% per generation. One of 1% p.a. turns into 28% per generation
and one of 2% per p.a. turns into 64% per generation. With these figures in mind parameter values
can be presented.
The exogenous increase in labor productivity is assumed to be 0.608, corresponding
to  2% p.a. (the  average rate  of per capita growth identified by Barro was 2.2% p.a.)  and  the
depreciation rate is 0.72 corresponding to 5% p.a. The degree of altruism is taken as 0.3, meaning
that  a  parent  is concerned  about the welfare of a  single child only 30% as much as they are
concerned about their own welfare. However, the elasticity  with which this declines with the number
of children, f,  is taken as 0.45. The elasticity of utility with respect to co isumption, a, is 0.4.
The costs of raising children are assumed to be 10% of potential labor time and 20%
of potential goods output. These may seem rather high but figures of this magnitude are needed
to keep the rate of fertility which the model delivers down to a 'reasonable' level.
The parameter values are summarized in the following  table:
Table 7  Parameter Values
a  =0.3  a = 0.2  b=0.1  A =  0.28
G  =0.608  e = .4 5 a=0.429
With these parameter values the model  solves  to give the results  shown  in table 8.
Table 8  Model Solution
Fertility  Rate  1.1%  p.a.
Capital-Output  Ratio  1.93  per annum
Investment  Ratio  7.5%
Interest Rate  6.83%  p.a.
3.3  Sensiwtviy  Analysis
The sensitivity  of these results can be explored  by variation  in the key parameters
of the model. Variations in three parameters are considered.  These are the exogenous  rate of
growth,  the degree of altruism and the cost of raising  children.  The following  graphs show the
effects  of these variations.
The first and second  panels  of figure  1  demonstrate  just how  sensitive  the results  are
to the degree of altruism  and to the cost of raising  children.  An apparently  small ;ncrease  in the
altruism parameter leads to a rapid increase in fertility.  The increase in fertility caused by an
increased liking for children is associated  with an increase in the capital-output ratio and a
reduction in the rate of interest not shown on the graph.  A reduction in the cost of raising
children,  represented  by a reduction  in parameter  a of equation (10) also leads  to an increase  in
fertility.  But because this is caused  by a lower  cost of children  and not a greater liking for them,
the increase  in fertility  is in fact  associated  with a reduction  in the capital-output  ratio and a rise
in the interest rate.
The third panel  demonstrates  that, although  a higher rate of growth  reduces  fertility
at a given interest rate, in the solution of the full model a higher rate of growth raises the
equilibrium  interest rate by so much that the fertility  rate is increased  in the complete  solution.
Faster growth  cannot,  on its own, lead to a slowdown  in fertility.  This result seems to persist for
a wide range of parameters. Searching  over figures  which  led to plausible  rates of fertility,  it was
not possible  to find a situation in which  faster growth in productivity  was associated  with lower
fertility.
3.4  Educatin and Flhity
We can now  look at the case where  education  affects  the level of productivity  of an
individual  but not its overall  growth  rate. This is not quite as straightforward  as it might seem.  The30
model  above  is set out in discrete  time,  with  each  interval  being  one generation  or twenty-five  years.
Furthermore  it is assumed  that children  do not  work  at all in the generation  In which  they  are born,
and the labor  cost of raising  children  is therefore adult time foregone.  This simple  structure  is not
sufficient  for looking  at the effects  of education.
Becker,  Murphy,  and Tamura  (1990)  suggest  an extension  of the model.  They  assume
that adults  can vary  the labor time which  tLey  devote  to raising  children  and that the human  capital
of the children is a function  of this labor input. Secondly,  they assume that the human capital
generated per unit of labor input is increasing  for relatively  small labor inputs. Neither of these
assumptions  are satisfactory. On the first point, the main cost of education  is not the time of the
teacher but the foregone  labor time of the person  being taught,  a point recognized  by Rosenzweig
(1990).  On the issue of increasing  returns, there is only  limited support for their view.  Denison's
(1967) suggestion  that the return on education  is about 5% p.a. for up to 8 years and 8% p.a.
beyond that indeed supports the argument.  But Card and Krueger (1992),  discussing  the United
State,  suest  roughly  constant returns (labor income rising exponentially  with the duration of
education),  while  the figures  quoted by Psacharopoulos  (1985)  suggest  a diminishing  social  retum.
In the light of the empirical  evidence,  it seems  perfectly  satisfactory  to settle for a linear relation
between length of education  and future eaming power. This does have the implication  that it
removes  the multiple  equilibria  from Becker,  Murphy,  and Tamura's model' but, without  a clear
empirical  basis for the non-linearity,  this is probably  sensible.
The basic changes  made to the Barro/Becker  model  are therefore to assume that
children  can divide  their time between  work  and education.  The wage  that they  earn once  education
terminates  depends  exponentially  on the duration of their education.  But the introduction  of child
labor requires  some  care. Even if earning  capacity  is attributed  to children,  in terms of some  adult
equivalent,  the model  is still  not satisfactory.  The discrete-time  structure  implies  that someone  who
is educated will have to wait a whole  generation  before reaping any benefit from that education.
This will  grossly  undervalue  the benefits  of education  compared  with the more realistic situation
in which  the benefits of education  accrue  immediately  after education  is concluded.  A number  of
modifications  must therefore be made to the model.
flae  problm is  perhaps  the issue  of widening  veru  deepening.  Returns  may  be higher  if more  people
ae educated  Luca (1988)  susted  bis  question  undoubtedly  merits  further  investigation.  None  of the
empirical  studis considered  hitherto  have  investigated  the issue,  but it is of course  possible  that it might
expla  the rol of the dummy  variables  observed  by  Barro  (1991)  for Afia  and  Latin  America.31
2.
Figure I  Influences  on  the  2A ..........................
Fertility Rate  2.
i)  The Effects  of Altruism  Is
1.4-  .....  ....................
The altruism parameter indicates the  /
importance  that parents  attach to their  I  060.  0.38  0.39 0.
children's welfare relative to their own  AhulnFaso
welfare.
3S
iI)  The  Impact  of the  Cost  of Raising  ,  ...................
Children
2  ,  ....................... _  .I  _.._..
The cost is measured as the fraction of  II  2...  ..........  .
adult  labour  time  allocated  per  child.
1S  ..  .........................  ..  ......
ai  o0  obe  04  G  01  0ob  7  o  0  0  C  o  C  .1
Lab_  COIdChdWrbn
12
iii)  The  Effect of  Growth in per  25
Capita  Income  .
1.5  ......  ..  e  ..  2. 2..  .2  2.3  2:4  2.5
..........  ....  %  . a............32
The interval  during  which  the child  grows  up must be treated in continuous  time if
the work/  education  choice  is to be modelled  properly.  For the purposes  of this  model,  it is assumed
that child labor income accrues  to its parent.  For a child starting  work after a fraction  b,' of the
ith period,  we can calculate  the discounted  value of child labor income  valued  at the start of the
period. The discounted  value of child labor' at the start of the period is, taking  account  of trend
growth,
wf,|e  G*'R/dt  (16)
where G is the continuous time equivalent of the growth rate and Ri is the continuous time
equivalent  of the rate of ir.terest  so that
G-log(1  +g);  R 1uIog(l+r 1)  (17)
However,  the value of the adult wage  discounted  back to the start of the period is
r 1 wpe  "'dt-w.(l  -e aR)I(Rj-G)  (18)
and the child wage  calculated  in equation (16) is therefore divided  by (1 - eGm)/(RcG)
so as to bring it to par with the adult wage.
The effect of education on  the wage rate  can be  represented by the  simple
exponential  function
w. W,s"e'  -Wse  s/l+g)i  (19)
where W,  is the notional  wage  per unit of effective  labor paid to someone  who  is uneducated  and
b,H'  is the fraction  of the period of youth for which  the person concerned  has been educated.  x. is
the extent to which  earning power  is raised per unit period of education.  This then defines  the
effective  child  wage
'This  assumes  that the child  wage  rate is  the same  as the adult  wage  rate.  This  is perhaps  reasonable  if
one is looking  at a developing  country  for  which  the  optimal  values  of b,' are of the order  of 0.6  or more.  If
children  are paid  markedly  less  than  adults  the opportunity  cost  of education  is reduced.33
uW  W.  e  (G-b  a  (20)
with ui' = u1(l+g)'  defining the actual wage. This income should be included in the budget
constraint,  so that equation (2) becomes
w,'+n4u 1 '+(l+r)kjECj*fln,(8i+kj:l)  (21)
and the associated  dynastic  budget constraint  is
kA;;+  dj(Nw, +N 1. 1 u),  .d(Np,  +N.1$)  (22)
It can be seen that, if the income  from child  labor is an exogenous  variable  like the adult wage  rate,
then we can define the net cost of raising  children  as P'i  = ,i  - u,* and the analysis  proceeds  as
before.  However,  things  are changed  once the duration  of education  is chosen  by the parent. Now
it is necessary  to optimize  over this variable,  bl', as well  as over consumption,  c,  and family  size,
n, or its cumulant,  N 1.
In fact, the first-order  conditions  in equations  (5) and (6) are unchanged  by the link
between  wage rates, income from child labor and education.  ti 3 1  is simply  replaced  by  '  The
education  decision,  if left to the private sector, is simply  the maximization  of the dynastic  budget
constraint  over the education  duration  variable  b,' The life-time  income  of the child  is the sum of
the discounted value of its child and adult labor, u,*  w  W,+,.(l +g)I(l +rd. Maximization of this over
bi'  yields the optimal duration of education,
bi'/-2og I  10(23)
but also subject  to the requirement  that 0 < b,' < 1.
The solution  of the model  is scarcely  more complicated  than in the previous  case.
b,'  is now  an endogenous  parameter determined  by  the endogenous  rate of interest.  Simulations  are
carried out as before, with only one change  made. Now that child labor is recognized,  the adult
labor involved  in looking  after children  has to be raised, and a figure of 0.3 per child is used.
The first panel  on figure  2 shows  the link  between  the duration  of education  and the
excess  of the interest rate over the return to education.  It is, in effect,  a plot of equation (23),  with34
the growth  rate remaining  at 2% p.a. Since  the growth  rate is constant,  it is not surprising  that the
duration of education  falls  off sharply  as the interest rate rises relative  to the return on education.
The next  two graphs  show  the link between  the return to education  and the rate of
fertility. Rather surprisingly,  as the rate of return to education increases, the rate of fertility
increases as well. The reason for this can be understood by reference to the third panel in
conjunction  with equation (23). As the rate of return on education  increases,  the rate of interest
increases  by more,  so that the discounted  benefit  of education  is actually  reduced.  Since  the interest
rate is determined  endogenously  as part of the model,  it has not proved  possible  to unravel  why  the
interest rate rises  in response  to an increase  in the rate of return to education.  But the consequence
of the increased  interest rate is that education  becomes  more expensive.  The period of education
is therefore shortened  and, since  children  become  cheaper in terms of net labor time, the rate of
fertility  actually  increases.  However,  If,  as in the third  panel,  one looks  at the relationship  between
the excess  of the rate of interest over the return to education,  and the rate of fertility,  the expected
relationship  is observed.  The greater the exoess  of the interest rate over the return to education,
the lower  is the optimal  period of education  (figure  2i) and therefore, as shown  in the third panel,
the higher the rate of optimal fertility.
It should  be noted that the perverse relationship  shown  in the second panel would
not be found if the rate of interest were fixed  exogenously.  In the closed  economy  discussed  here,
it is true that each individual  treats the rate of interest as fixed  but it is, nevertheless,  sensitive  to
their aggregate  spending  and saving  decisions. In a small developing  country  which  allows  free
inflow of  capital, the  interest rate  may be  influenced by world capital markets. In  such
circumstances  a rising  return to education  wil have  the effect  of reducing  the rate of fertility  rather
than leading  to the increase  shown  here.  A second  point to note is the great sensitivity  of the results
to the (private) return to education.  It  is unlikely  that this will ever be measured with great
precision,  and, in any case, there must be a great deal of or ante uncertainty.
The links between education and economic  growth are now discussed.  This is
followed  by an extension  of the model so as to demonstrate  possible links between the level of
education  and long-term  economic  growth.35
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4.  Modelling  the Effects  of Education  on Growth  and Development
The analysis  of education  so far has been in microeconomic  terms. Individuals  are
assumed  to choose the optimal  duration of education  so as to maximize  the value of the dynastic
budget  constraint.  Children  are educated  to the point at which  the discounted  value  of extra  income
generated  by marginal  education  is just equal to the total cost of that education.  In the model set
out in section  3 economic  growth  was purely exogenous  labor-saving  technical  progress.
In fact, as was observed  in the discussion  of Barro's results,  there are three possible
links  between  education  and economic  growth.  First  of all, education  raises  the effective  size  of the
labor force  because  it increases  the labor productivity  of individuals.  During a period in which  the
educational  standard of the population  is rising,  this stock-adjustment  effect  will  lead to economic
growth.  It was argued, using the example  described  in the Appendix,  that this might account  for
about half of the effect described  by Barro. The second and third links between education  and
growth are  described by Lucas (1988). His suggestions  are  firstly that knowledge does not
completely  disappear  with the death of an educated  generation,  but that some of it is inherited by
their successors.  Secondly,  at a social  level,  a high average  level  of education  raises the benefit  of
education  to any individual.  A consequence  of these effects  is that high  levels  of education  will  be
associated  with rapid rates of technical  progress.
T  his section  begins  with an outline  of models  of economic  growth  and development.
Simulations  of the model  are then carried  out in order to assess  possible  effects  between  education,
growth  and fertility.
4.1  Conventional  Neo-Clawical  Growth  Modls
The relationship between education and economic development at  the  broad
macroeconomic  level  has largely  been analyzed  within  the framework  of neo-classical  growth  theory
models  developed  by Solow  (1956). Denison (1961)  advocated  an analysis  of education  based on
a growth accounting  framework,  using an aggregate  production function  Y=F(KL), where Y is
output, K is capital and L is labor.  Using this structure  estimates  of the effects  of education  on
output can be made. Denison's  own  calculations  showed  that between  1930  and 1960  around 23%
of the rate of growth in U.S. output is explained  by the increased level of education of the
workforce. Nadiri (1972) used this approach to analyze developing  economies and his study
presented a mix of results. For some countries,  such as Ghana, there were strong educational
affects  (23.2%  of output growth  is explained  by education),  whereas  for others like  Colombia,  it was
relatively  low (4.1%  of output growth  is explained  by education).37
More recently Lucas (1988) has criticized the neo-classical growth theory model as
a vehicle for explaining the mechanics of development. At this point it is useful to summarize the
main characteristics of the neo-classical growth model.  The Solow growth model in its simplest
guise is developed by assuming a closed economy, competitive markets, rational agents and constant
returns  to scale.  Fertility is taken to be exogenous, as is the growth in the level of technology.
These two assumptions preclude the possibility  of externality effects feeding through education via
technical change, fertility, nutrition and other indirect effects. The model aims to solve for a (per
capita) consumption path. Along a balanced path the rate of growth of per-capita magnitudes is
proportional to the exogenous rate of technical change and the inverse of the share of labor in
output.  The Solow  model predicts that economies with access to similar technologies will  converge
to a common balanced growth path.
The Solow  neo-classical  growth model was a major contribution to economic theory
in that it emphasized the distinction between growth effects (changes in parameters  that affect
growth rates along balanced paths) and level effects (changes in parameters that raise or lower the
balanced growth path but not its rate of change).  In this context changes in savings rates turn out
to have level effects, higher savings affect output levels but not growth in output.  The same can
be said of market inefficiency effects, such as trade barriers.  The removal of trade barriers will
have a desirable effect on output levels, but growth will not be affected.  Denison used the Solow
growth model to assess the factors contributing to growth in the United States.  Lucas (1988) made
the following  comment on this approach.
'In  the main, the theory adds little to what common sense would tell
us about  the direction of each effect - it is easy enough to guess
which changes stimulate production, hence savings, and  hence (at
least  for  a  time)  economic  growth.  Yet  most  such  changes,
quantified, have trivial effects: The growth rate of an entire economy
is not an easy thing to move around."
Lucas goes on to remark that the Solow  growth model is not a story of development
because it has the apparent  inability to  account for observed differences in growth rates across
countries and it possesses the counterfactual prediction that international trade should lead to rapid
movement toward equality in capital-labor ratios and factor prices. The Solow  growth model cannot
be used therefore  to explain persistent differences in growth rates.  Despite these drawbacks he
believes that growth theory offers the potential to explain variations in development across different
countries. Indeed he remarks 'technology...is  the one factor isolated by the neo-classical model that
has the potential to account for wide differences in income levels and growth rates." The hypothesis
he puts forward is that by incorporating human capital as a proxy for the utilization of knowledge
this will lead to a story of endogenous growth.38
42  HSuman  Capita  ModAs  and Growth
The human  capital  approach  can be married  with  growth  theory to incorporate  the
extemality  effects of education.  This is what Romer (1986), Lucas (1988) and recently van
Marrewijk  et al. (1992)  and Aghion  and Howitt  (1992)  set out to achieve  and a simple  application
of their approach is used subsequently 1 . Romer considers  an economy in which knowledge  is
produced  with a diminishing  returns technology.  New knowledge  generates a positive  externality
through  copy-cat  or learning-by-doing  effects. Consumption  goods are produced  as a function  of
the stock  of knowledge  and of other inputs. The crucial  assumption  is that the stock  of knowledge
in the production  function for consumption  goods  exhibits  increasing  returns. Romer introduces
the distinction  between  private  and social  factors  of production,  where  private refers to labor input
and social  may be some average  measure of labor quality  at an economy  wide level. Within this
framework  he shows  that per capita output  can grow  without  bound,  that the rate of investment  and
the rate of return to capital  may increase  (rather than decrease)  with an increasing  capital stock,
and the level of per capita output does not necessarily  converge  across countries.  This paper
represented  one of the first major contributions  linking  development  with growth.
Lucas  develops  the Solow  growth  model  by incorporating  human  capital. Within  this
framework  a model  with  homogeneous  workers  is considered.  A worker  is assumed  to choose  what
fraction of time to devote to current production,  with the remainder being allocated to human
capital  accumulation. The worker has a skill  type  which  can be enhanced  by the accmulation of
human  capital. Thus total output becomes  a function  of the level  of the capital  stock,  the number
of workers and the quality  of workers.  The important feature of the model is the distinction
between  intemal and extemal  effects  of human  capital  accumulation.  The internal effect  of human
capital  is the direct effect  the acquisition  of knowledge  has on productivity.  The extemal effect  is
the indirect  effect  of human  capital  accumulation  modelled  as flowing  from the average  level  of skWll
in the economy.
In fact  two  external  effects  are present.  A higher  average  level  of skill  raises  the level
of individual  productivity  associated  with a given amount  of time invested  in human capital.  And
a constant flow  of investment  in human  capital  leads  to a situation  in which  the average  skiI level
is constantly  increasing  (despite the fact that human capital is continuously  being lost through
death). This then leads to an intertemporal  externality.  The investment  of one generation  benefits
future generations.
10  Similar  approaches  were  first  put forward  by  Arow (1962)  and  Uzawa  (1965).39
The study by Aghion and Howitt looks at the implications  of a situation in which
economic growth is  achieved through research-induced  innovation. The prospect of  future
innovation  reduces the quasi-rents  available  to any current innovation,  and the implications  of
future research expenditure  for current research  expenditure  are studied.  This is probably  only  of
limited  relevance  to developing  countries.
On the other hand van Marrewijk,  de Vries and Withagen  look at a situation in
which  there are three inputs  into production,  capital,  labor and human  capital.  Their analysis  differs
from that of Lucas in that human capital is seen as a third factor of production instead of
interacting  to enhance  the effective  labor supply.  Recently-published  work  by Mankiw,  Romer and
Weil (1992)  lends  empirical  support  to this  view,  and appears  to contradict  the idea that there may
be increasing  returns associated  with either capital accumulation  or with education. The model
underlying  their empirical  work,  which  was discussed  in section  2, is one in which  there are three
factors  of production,  labor,  human  capital  and physical  capital;  Mankiw,  Romer  and Weil  estimate
a Cobb-Douglas  production  function  with  these three factors  present and can accept  the hypothesis
that the coefficients  sum to 1, although  they do not investigate  the possibility  of non-linear  effects
from their human  capital  variable;  the implication  of this is that they reject Lucas'  hypothesis  that
the returns to education  are higher in a society  with a high average  level of education.  As noted
in section  2, they use school  attendance  as a proxy  for human capital,  but acknowledge  that they
are  unsure whether school attendance represents the level of human capital, or whether it
represents  the gross  addition  to a stock  which  would  otherwise  depreciate.  The latter interpretation
is consistent  with the intertemporal  externality  identified  by Lucas' model, and it is that aspect
which  we investigate  subsequently.
Where does this take us with respect to education  and development? First the
model  is capable  of explaining  differences  in growth  rates across  countries  like those described  in
section 2.  Differences  are explained  by differences  in humr.an  capital arising  from differences  in
education. From a policy  perspective  this suggests  that if developing  economies  are to catch up
with  more successful  economies,  it becomes  necessary  to take action  to raise  the rate of investment
in human  and physical  capital above that which  would  be done if investment  decisions  were left
to the private sector.
4.3  Overlapping  Genrato  Modeki  and Growth
The intertemporal  externality  naturally finds expression  through the overlapping
generations  framework  used in the model  of section  3. This  offers  a way  of describing  how  the stock
of kmowledge  may  be passed  on from one generation  to the next  even if it decays  somewhat  in the40
process. Before inserting this effect into the simulation model, a brief account of some of the other
work of this qpe  is offered.
Azariadis and Drazen (1990) construct a model that results in a multiplicity of locally
stable balanced growth paths.  In their model they introduce technological externalities featuring
a threshold property.  Thus for certain state variables like the quality of labor measured by literacy
rates, when they reach a critical value then the externality impact becomes large." 1 In other words
for increases in growth to take place it is necessary for an economy to reach a threshold level in
labor quality, which means that education will play an important role in development.
The one sector approach of Diamond (1965) is used; population is constant; there
is no national debt and no technical progress.  As with Diamond a multiplicity of steady-states is
shown to exist and it is argues that variations in social inputs (for example human capital) can affect
the steady state.  The model has a stronger microeconomic foundation than the Lucas framework.
Within it agents choose the level of training that maximizes  their utility, knowing that training when
young improves productivity when old.  They show that when individual yields to human capital
investment rise with the average quality of labor, then there exist a multiplicity  of balanced growth
paths.
Becker, Murphy and Tamura  (1990) come to similar conclusions. They present a
model in which fertility is endogenous, being chosen as described in the model set out in section
3  with  households  maximizing a  dynastic  utility function.  Households  choose  the  level  of
expenditure on education so as to maximize their welfare through the effects of education on their
offspring's income. The return to education is assumed to be low for small levels of education and
then to rise for increasing amounts of education before falling off again for very high levels. This
means that when human capital is scarce, the return to investing in human capital is low compared
to the effect of investing in children. There are in fact two steady states to the model, one with high
fertility, little education and a small capital stock, and the other with low fertility, a large capital
stock and a high level of education. However, this result is crucially dependent on the structure of
the function describing the return to education. Of the externalities described by Lucas, the results
of  Mankiw, Romer  and  Weil  (1992) suggest one  can  reject the  spatial  externality. But  the
intertemporal extemality cannot be so controversial. No one doubts that knowledge is passed on
"Bowman  and Anderson  (1963)  formalised  the threshold  argument  in this context,  using  1950s  data to
suggest  that a literacy  rate of between  30 and 40 percent is a precondition  for take-off  in growth.  Easterlin
(1981)  discusses  the role of primary  education  in economic  take-off  from a historical  perspective.  In fact the
average  developing  country,  with  over 90%  of the relevant  age  group  now  receiving  primary  education,  ought
to have crossed  the sort of threshold  which  Easterlin  identifies.41
from one generation to the next. Once a technique has been invented it does not normally have to
be reinvented. The model of section 3 is therefore extended while retaining the simple log-linear
relationship between education and earning power.
4.4  Simultion with Endogeowus  Growth
We can model the growth in aggregate productivity by means of the relationship 12
WN=A'WI  ,+vb,',W,,  (24)
where bH.' is the duration of schooling determined by equation  (23) and A' is the rate at which
human capital decays. The model implies a rate of growth of labor productivity of
g,-A'-1+vb,',  (2)
The population is assumed to be large, so that, by means of education, families can
choose their own income relative to the labor productivity variable. However, each family cannot
have a perceptible impact on the rate of growth. This means that the first order conditions for
solving the model are unchanged. The only difference is that the rate of growth, instead of being
exogenous, is described by equation (25). For simulation purposes, the coefficient on the duration
of education, v, is assumed to be 0.032, corresponding to the value derived by Weale (1992) which
appears to be perfectly consistent with Barro's results. The equation is normalized so that, in the
hypothetical case of zero education, growth of 1% p.a. would still be possible 13.
The simulation properties are summarized in figure 3. The first panel is simply  a plot
of equation  (25), showing the link between education and  growth. Secondly, the link between
fertility and economic growth is plotted. The mechanism is straightforward. High education leads
to faster growth but, at the same time, it raises the cost of children and so leads to a reduction in
the rate of fertility. The results suggest an elasticity of fertility to growth in per capita GDP of
around 3. The third panel combines the other two, presenting the relation between fertility and
education once the effects of endogenous growth are taken into account.
"2Such an expression  is consistent  with a situation in which human capital and labor enter into the
production  function  multiplicatively.  Mankiw,  Romer  and Weil (1992)  suggest  that the evidence  is consistent
with this.
'The mechanism  is not discussed.  This growth  can be thought of as arising  from catch-up with the
advanced  countries.42
These results  are broadly  compatible  with  Barro's findings.  A decline  in the fertility
rate from 2.5% to 0.2% is associated  with an extension  of education  of 0.21,  or 5.2 years. With a
10-year  schooling  program  this is approximately  equivalent  to an increase  in the proportion of the
school-age  cohort attending  school  of 0.52.  Converting  the simulated  figures  from rates of fertility
to numbers of children  per adult, the decline  in fertility  is from 1.85  to 10.5  children. Doubling
these indicates  the change in the number  of children  per woman.  The fall in number of children
per woman  is 1.6  associated  with  an increase  in participation  at both types  of school  of 0.52.  Barro's
results imply,  adding  together the coefficients  for primary and secondary  school  attendance,  that
this  would  reduce  the number  of children  per woman  by 2.4,  not very different  from  the simulation
figure of 1.6.  This suggests  that the simulation  exercise  is reasonably  consistent  with the facts.  In
particular it lends support to the idea that fertility  is, at least in part, an economic  decision  and
therefore that fertility  is likely  to be affected  by any change,  such  as the availability  of education,
which  alters the cost of having  children.
5.  Conclusions:  The External Benefits  of Education  in Developing  Countries
There is a reasonable  amount  of evidence  for three types  of externality  arising  from
higher education.  First of all, education  seems to be associated  with an improvement  in public
health.  In developing  countries  the evidence  relates  to infant  mortality,  but other effects,  which  have
been identified  in developed  countries,  may  also be present.
Secondly,  there is ample evidence for a link between education and fertility in
developing  countries.  This  can be explained  in economic  terms  by the idea that education  raises  the
effective  labor time parents  have  to devote  to looking  after their children,  because  it deprives  them
of the availability  of child labor.  Microeconomic  studies indeed identify  links between fertility,
education  and child  wages  but the elasticities  are generally  lower  than those  found  by cross-country
comparisons  of fertility  rates. Whatever  one's view  on the desirability  of lower  fertility,  a reduction
in fertility  should  be seen as a consequence  of the widening  of the availability  of education.
Thirdly,  it is also  suggested  that there is a link between  education  and 'endogenous'
growth or technical  progress. This is harder to determine because a rising level of educational
attainment leads to output growth even in the absence of such an externality.  However,  crude
calculations  performed  in this paper suggest  that the observed  link between school  enrolment  and
economic  growth  is roughly  twice  what  would  be expected  to accrue  simply  from the rising  level  of
attainment. These figures are, however,  based on the assumption  that education  raises earning
power  by between  5% and 8% p.a. Many  of the estimates  of the return to education  in developing
oountries  are higher than this and, if such figures are accepted the gap between these and the
results of cross-country  comparisons  to be bridged  by such an externality  is much reduced.43
Flgure  3  The  Duration  of  0 
Education,  the Rate  of
Growth  and  the  075
Fertility Rate  I
j0.7  ..........................
0.........  .............
i)  The Fraction of  'Youth' spent In  W
Education  and the Rate of per  C  apia  0  .. ,  . ...........  . ._
Growth____________  __
1row8s  1.9  2  21  22  .3  2.i  .s  2.6
Pase  d G,owth  %  pA.
ii)Fertility  and  Growth in  Output per  l
Capita  0
.. 1.....................,..........  ...  ....
1a8  1.9  2  2:1  2.2  23  24  2.5  2.6
Rate  d Gwh  % p.a
lifi)be  Fertility  Rate  and  the Fraction  of
'Youth'  spent  in Education
Lt  .........  ,_  ,,,,,,,,,,<.....................
0.5  ......
O i5  066  0.65  0.7  ON  0.8
Ageatwt*ch  EtuaUfonm  Cmos44
The fertility  and technical  progress  effects  should  be regarded  as closely  interrelated.
A simulation  model has been set up in which  fertility  is modelled  as an economic  decision;  the
fertility  rate is found to be positively  related  to the difference  between  the rate of interest and the
return to education.  When the rate of technical  progress  is made dependent  on the cumulation  of
human  capital,  it is found  that rapidper  capita economic  growth  is associated  with slow  fertility  and
vice versa. Moreover  the magnitudes  which  emerge from the model  are broadly compatible  with
those found empirically.  The simulation  model therefore sheds insight  on why these empirical
interrelationships  may  be observed.
The fertility  effects  must be dependent  on broadly-based  education  rather then the
focusing  of high-quality  education  onto an elite. But it is very difficult  to say whether  the growth
effect arises  from breadth or depth (which  in itself  can be either longer  education  or better quality
education). The macroeconomic  analyses do not distinguish  the two, although it ought to be
possible  to test whether  secondary  education  has an equal or higher effect on growth than does
primary education. This would be an argument for depth. On the other hand a  non-linear
(increasing)  effect  on growth  arising  from a particular  type  of education  might be an indicator  of
the importance  of widening  rather than deepening.  Of course  an assessment  of the costs as well  as
the benefits is likely  to tip the argument  towards  the provision  of a wide level  of basic education
in the first instance.  Technical  progress  is no use unless  people  are able to make use of it. But this
does not answer  the point because different  levels  of knowledge  need different  levels  of skill  for
their exploitation.
The conclusions  of this survey  may  then be summarized  succinctly.  Education  leads
to a fertility externality  and to a growth externality.  More research is needed to determine the
structure  of the growth  externality  and the presence  of any increasing  returns to education.  But the
presence  of both externalities  is documented  well  enough  for them to be taken into account  in cost-
benefit analyses.45
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APPENDIX  Population Dynamles  and Economic  Growth
This appendix demonstrates  how an increase in the fraction of the population
undergoing  secondary  education  will lead to faster growth  of GDP  per capita without  there being
any externality  of the type described  by Lucas  (1988)  present.
The following  assumptions  are made. First of all it is assumed that population  is
growth  steadily  at 2.05%  p.a., the mean rate identified  by Barro (1991).  Secondly  it is assumed  that,
up to the age of 4, the death rate is 87 per 1000,  the rate identified  by Barro. Beyond  the age of
4 it is assumed  that the probability  of dying  is given  by the Gompertz function,  el'1 7 with the
choice of parameters being dictated by the need to ensure a reasonable  expectation  of life (57
years) and at the same time to yield,  in combination  with the population  growth  rate, a population
with half the population  under the age of 28. These stylized  facts  are probably  broadly  consistent
with a notional  developing  country  although  there are some  where the median age is as low  as 18.
In 1950  the average  fraction  of the population  of secondary-school  age undergoing
secondary  education  was 0.1. By 1960  this had risen to 0.23  and in 1985  it was 0.53,  with the rate
of increase  of the fraction  being  close to 0.012  per annum.
If we assume  that in the years before 1950  the fraction  of the relevant  age group
attending  secondary  school  was  also  0.1,  it is then possible  to calculate  the fraction  of the workforce
(aged 17-65)  with secondary-school  education.  The fact that there are always  more young  people
than old people means that it rises quite quickly  in line with the school  throughput, from 0.13 in
1960  to 0.34  in 1985.  With a five-year  secondary-school  course, the average  attainment level  of the
workforce  has risen by 1.08  full  years  between  1960  and 1985.  Denison's  rule of thumb  suggests  that,
as a consequence  wages  will have risen by 5-8% in real terms. If wages comprise  75% of the
product, then GDP will  be 4-6%  higher than in a country  where secondary-school  attendance  has
remained  at 0.1 of the relevant  age group  throughout. The effect  on the growth  rate will  be 0.04/25
to 0.06/25=0.0016  to 0.0024 p.a. and this has been bought  by an increase  in the fraction  attending
secondary  school  of 0.13  in 1965.  It suggests  that the coefficient  of the fraction  taking secondary
education  should  be 0.0016/0.13  to 0.0024/0.13=  0.012  to 0.018  if there is no externality  present.  The
lower limit is only just over 1 standard deviation  below the figure which Barro quotes in the
regression  from which  fertility  is excluded.
These calculations  suggest  that Barro's results are likely  to be consistent  with the
hypothesis  of no externality  from education,  but it is also true that the population  effects only
explain  about half of Barro's coefficients.  One might therefore argue that about half of the effect51
of education identified by Barro is an externality,  and this figure is fairly close to the result
identified by Weale (1992) from attainment data for the developed  countries. Obviously  the
precision  of the calculations  could  be improved  by use of actual  life tables  which  reflect  the increase
in the life expectancy  of the population  during the period instead of the hypothetical  life table
described  here. There can be no doubt that stock  adjustment  effects  have to be unravelled  before
clear evidence  for an externality  can be identified.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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